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The World Bank is a leading intellectual institution on 
development. It is a world leader in analytical studies in 
areas including poverty measurement, delivery of social 
services, impact evaluation, measurement of development 
outcomes, international trade and migration. It is also 
a leader in development data, including the Living 
Standard Measurement Surveys; the enterprise surveys, 
and the International Price Comparison Project. World 
Bank research is resolutely empirical and policy oriented. 
By both learning from past policies and operations and 
thinking critically about future policies, research plays 
a critical role in the formulation of policy advice to 
developing countries.
   This paper reviews the intellectual and institutional 
forces that have shaped research at the World Bank 
since the latter started lending to developing countries 
in the early 1950s. It provides an overview of the shifts 
in development economics that have influenced Bank 
research and briefly surveys the changes in research 
organization, structure and approach.
This paper—a product of the Development Economics, Operations and Strategy Department—is part of a larger effort 
by the World Bank to strengthen the complementarities between research and operations and to disseminate high-quality 
research that is relevant for policymakers in developing countries. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the 
Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. For information, contact jdethier@worldbank.org.  
   The first section, after a short introduction, examines 
the shifts in positive and normative views about 
development during the past half century that have 
influenced Bank thinking. The Bank itself has been 
an active participant in the rise and fall of long-lived 
development dogmas about the nature of development; 
the most appropriate policies and actions for achieving it; 
and the respective roles of government and markets. 
   The second section examines how the World Bank 
has adapted its organization to keep abreast of emerging 
issues and produce relevant policy research of good 
quality. On the one hand, the Bank has experienced 
several reorganizations that have affected the research 
unit(s) as well as its relationship with operational units. 
On the other hand, the Bank’s research units themselves 
have been reorganized at several junctures, leading to new 
priorities and new means of achieving them. WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
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1  Introduction 
 
World Bank research has changed over time, both in terms of thematic emphasis and 
approach, to keep abreast of emerging issues.  The general direction taken by Bank research 
has been shaped by a combination of forces, both intellectual and institutional.  This paper 
reviews the shifts in mainstream development economics that have influenced Bank research, 
and briefly surveys the changes in organization, structure and approach that have been 
adopted to define the Bank’s research priorities over time.   
 
First, positive and normative views about development have gone through several shifts 
during the past half century.
  There have been changes in intellectual views regarding what 
development is and what are the most appropriate policies and actions for achieving 
development.  The Bank, for instance, has been an active participant in the rise and fall of 
several long-lived development dogmas about the respective roles of government and 
markets.  
 
Second, the Bank has experienced several reorganizations that have affected not only the 
administrative structure of research, but also the relationship between research and 
operations.  In addition to Bankwide reorganizations, the Bank’s Research Department has 
itself been reorganized at several junctures, leading to new priorities and new means of 
achieving them.  
 
In terms of research priorities, there have been several major shifts.  In the 1970s, there was a 
preoccupation with reducing the gap between rich and poor countries and the research 
focused on how to promote the redistribution of income in developing countries so as to 
reduce the crushing burden of absolute poverty.  In the 1980s, the focus shifted toward 
market incentives, getting prices right and macroeconomic adjustment.  Energy was also high 
on the agenda and energy research received increased funding.  Gender issues and the 
environment appeared for the first time on the Bank’s research agenda in 1988.  The reform 
of socialist economies and AIDS was mentioned as special emphasis areas in 1989.  During 
the 1990s, poverty and inequality reemerged as research topics and corruption and “going 
beyond the Washington consensus” was seen as a topic in need of special attention. In the 
mid-2000s, emerging economies, and in particular China and India and their impact on the 
world, as well as infrastructure—after years of neglect in lending—have been mentioned as 
research priorities. 
 
The Bank also went through several phases in terms of its research approach.  Empirical  
development economics began in earnest in the early 1970s.
2
                                                 
2   This was the time (1971) when Simon Kuznets received the Nobel Prize in Economics “for his empirically 
founded interpretation of economic growth, which has led to new and deepened insight into the economic and 
social structure and process of development.”  
  An organized research 
program took shape at that time, the focus being on producing quantitative and data-heavy 4 
 
research, as well as making data on development accessible to the public.  Bank research also 
produced quantitative forecasting and planning models (such as general equilibrium models).  
In the 1980s, Anne Krueger initiated a shift toward more operationally relevant research, 
away from formal models. There was also a focus on multi-country comparative studies.  In 
the 1990s, there was an increasing trend toward empirical research and reliance on survey 
data, starting with household surveys.  This was part of a growing trend in research in 
development economics that, as stated by Debraj Ray (2008), “has been almost entirely 
empirical. A veritable explosion in computing power, the expansion of institutional datasets 
and their increased availability in electronic form, and the growing ease of collecting one's 
own data have bred a new generation of development economists.  Their empirical 
sensibilities are of a high order; they are extremely sensitive to issues of endogeneity, omitted 
variables, measurement error and biases induced by selection.  They are constantly on the 
search for good instruments or natural experiments, and, when these are hard to find, they are 
adept at creating experiments of their own.”  Researchers have greatly contributed, through 
cross-disciplinary approaches, sound analysis and empirical measurement, in moving the 
development agenda forward.   
2  An Evolving Vision of the Development Process 
 
The choice of strategy for research regarding developing countries has to rely on some vision 
of what economic development is, and what the basic mechanisms of the development 
process are.
3
2.1  Growth and Poverty Reduction 
  This vision changed over time, as developing countries adopted various policies 
and their results—successes or disappointments—were recorded. 
 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, development was viewed, in practice, as a process of accumulating 
physical or human capital, with the goal of increasing national income.
. A break occurred in 
the mid-1960s under the intellectual influence of Singer, Seers and others. The idea of 
development became more identified with processes of social change and poverty reduction.  
At the World Bank, this change in focus came mainly after President McNamara’s 1973 
speech at the annual meetings in Nairobi, which emphasized poverty eradication as the true 
goal of development.
 4
                                                 
3  See World Bank 1984.   This section summarizing changes in the Bank’s vision of the development 
process borrows from Wolfensohn and Bourguignon 2004 to which I made a substantive contribution. 
 
4  For an account of the history of the development concept, see Arndt 1987.  
 
    
 
During the long macroeconomic crisis that started at the end of the 1970s, poverty 
considerations were set aside. The neoliberal perspective that dominated the 1980s 
considered that growth was all that really mattered for welfare outcomes, and that poverty 
and inequality would take care of themselves. Proponents of that view downplayed 
distribution and poverty, and insisted on re-establishing market mechanisms to promote 
economic growth. Funding for research on poverty and income distribution peaked in 1975, 
then declined considerably, reaching almost zero between 1980 and 1985. 
 5 
 
A renewed emphasis on poverty reduction began in 1990. The understanding of poverty, 
under the influence of Sen and others, broadened from a narrow focus on income and 
consumption to a more complex vision of the linkages between growth and poverty 
reduction.  Richer countries tend to have better social indicators.  From this undeniable fact, 
the Bank drew the conclusion that human development promotes income growth and income-
poverty reduction. Not all economists share this view (For a dissenting view, see Anand and 
Ravallion 1993). 
  
The emphasis on poverty in the 1990s was not new. What was new from the late 1980s 
onward was the articulation of a more complete strategy, combining growth with delivering 
social services (education, health and social protection) to the poor. In other words, it was the 
recognition that it was not growth alone that would do it—which was implicitly the view of 
the 1980s.  At the World Bank, the change was spearheaded by the World Development 
Report on poverty in 1990, which included the first standardized global estimates of the 
prevalence of poverty, and by a strong shift in the institution’s emphasis after the arrival of 
James Wolfensohn as president in 1995. There was a vast expansion in analytic tools and 
capabilities, in both data and methods, linking micro data to aggregate outcomes, and with a 
view toward assessing policies and programs. This was built on the rapid expansion in 
household survey data production, which started in the mid 1980s.  
 
Box 1.  Changing Views of the Development Process since World War II 
 
Assar Lindbeck, who carried out an evaluation of World Bank research in 1984, writes: “The dominant vision 
among economists [with regard to the basic mechanisms of the development process] has changed considerably 
during the course of the post-World War II period. The main visions during the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s 
have usually been characterized as structuralist—ideas tied to names like Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Ragnar 
Nurkse, Raul Prebisch, Hans Singer and Gunnar Myrdal. The term “structuralist” then refers to the notion that 
the developing countries are characterized by genuine inflexibility in the allocation of resources, due to 
inelasticities of supply and demand for goods, services and factors, as well as of productive effort in response to 
changes in economic incentives, such as relative price signals. Based on this vision of the development process 
was the idea of binding constraints on economic growth, like the “two-gap” theory of a savings and balance-of-
payments constraint, due to asserted weaknesses in the response of saving to changes in income and interest 
rates, and of exports, imports and long-term capital movements to changes in exchange rates, relative prices and 
rates of return on productive assets. 
 
From these views followed both a strong distrust of the price mechanism, and as a mirror image, considerable 
enthusiasm for comprehensive central planning of inputs, outputs and investment activity. Recommendations 
were prevalent regarding public regulations and interventions to increase public saving and investment, the latter 
often in the form of large-scale projects in basic industries in order to deal with indivisibilities and externalities. 
Heavy protection, via direct controls (i.e., licensing) and high tariff barriers were other important components of 
the package of policy recommendations. Although some of these policies could certainly be well defended in the 
early post-World War II period, many governments were not flexible enough to shift to more decentralized and 
less interventionist policies when the usefulness of the previous approaches eroded.  
 
However, three decades of postwar development efforts, as well as accumulated empirical research, have 
gradually changed the predominant vision of the development process. The general thrust of new ideas reflects 
an increased respect for the importance of markets and economic incentives, combined with an increased 
skepticism about the usefulness of detailed government intervention and central planning of production and 
investment decisions, including large-scale public projects. First, the possibilities of substitution between labor 
and capital have come to be regarded as more important than earlier—a development in economic theory that is 
symbolized by the replacement of the Harrod-Domar growth equation with more flexible aggregate growth 
models a la Solow. Second, it has been increasingly asserted during the last one or two decades that the fine 
micro-structure of the economy does respond considerably to economic rewards and relative prices.  
Source:  World Bank 1984 6 
 
Since then, development economics—moving away from macroeconomic explanations à la 
Keynes or Harrod/Domar—has increasingly emphasized the microeconomic foundations of 
development.  Researchers and policymakers have realized how crucial micro-level decisions 
are for economic growth.  Examples are the role of women in household decision-making; 
the effects of the proportion of household resources controlled by women on the health and 
nutrition of their children; the role of microeconomics in poorly functioning land, labor, and 
credit markets; and the role of informal networks and institutions in dealing with market 
failures. The aim of this micro development literature is to understand what institutions may 
arise at the micro level to cope with such failures and to structure policy to provide for them. 
 
Recent research, both theoretical and empirical, has emphasized that there need not be a 




  This has led to the view, now shared by most development economists, that the 
economy grows and develops best when the majority of the population can participate in and 
benefit from growth. This view is described at length in the 2006 World Development Report 
on Equity.  Development strategies should aim to reduce sharp inequalities and equalize 
opportunities, and would thus improve both efficiency and equity. 
2.2  State vs. Markets 
 
In most developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s the dogma of planning held sway, with 
its emphasis on pervasive market failure and the need for a highly interventionist state. By 
the 1980s, the neoliberal counterrevolution had taken hold. Where the planners saw market 
failure, the neoliberals saw massive government failure, and their response was to move 
developing-country economies toward unregulated markets. “Getting prices right” was the 
mantra—an important corrective to the planning ideas, but equally incomplete as an approach 
to development. These competing ideologies continued to drive decision-making in many 
countries even after deeper economic analysis and extensive evidence undermined their 
credibility. The polarization of development debates and the lack of rigor in policy analysis 
did little to further the cause of poverty reduction.  
 
In the 1990s, the development community largely moved beyond the twin dogmas of 
pervasive state control (1960s–1970s) and unregulated markets (1980s–early 1990s). The 
latter half of the decade witnessed the gradual consolidation of a consensus that states and 
markets are in fact complementary. Private enterprise operating through the market is the 
main engine of sustained economic growth. But keeping that engine running and ensuring 
that it powers poverty reduction require a state that is active in two key areas. First, 
                                                 
5   Kuznets, Chenery and development economists in the 1970s posited that although inequality was undesirable 
as an end, it was a means to long-run growth, because wealthy people tended to save and invest more of their 
incomes.  The central policy challenge for the Bank in the 1970s was to achieve as much growth as possible and 
then to redistribute.  In the 1990s, the view—originating in research described in the World Bank’s 2006 World 
Development Report—changed.  Economists saw that there did not necessarily have to be a trade-off between 
growth and distribution of income. Policies aimed at reducing sharp inequalities and equalizing opportunities 
were having positive results for both efficiency and equity. For instance, ensuring access to education and health 
care improves the productivity of the poor, boosting their quality of life and potentially the dynamism of society. 
Access to work opportunities decreases the likelihood that people will resort to crime. Because economic power 
often translates into political power, greater equity can underpin a broader targeting of public policy. If well 
executed, measures to equalize opportunities for people to lead productive lives are good for consensus, social 
justice, political stability, and productivity. 
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government needs to ensure that the business climate is conducive to growth. Second, 
government needs to invest in and empower its people, particularly poor people who might 
otherwise be excluded, through education, health, social protection, and mechanisms for 
encouraging voice and participation. Without broad participation and more human capital, 
growth is unlikely to be fast and sustainable—because excluding large segments of society 
wastes potentially productive resources and breeds social conflict. 
 
2.3  The Role of Institutions & Governance  
   
In the 1980s, development approaches stressed improving policy, particularly in 
macroeconomics and trade, and “getting prices right” by removing government-imposed 
barriers to markets. But the 1990s awakened interest in institutions and governance—for four 
reasons. 
 
First, the failure of structural adjustment programs to spark growth in many low-income 
countries in the 1980s focused attention on the role of institutions and governance in 
development.  Second, and perhaps most important, the end of the Cold War removed self-
imposed blinders from the eyes of donor countries. Until the early 1990s, the United States 
and its allies had refrained from scrutinizing the governance failings of proxy states, for fear 
of undermining what they saw as the bulwark against communist expansion. But with the 
demise of the Soviet Union, both developed-country donors and developing-country citizens 
decried poor governance as a hindrance to development.  Third, the transition in the 
economies of Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union in the early and mid-1990s—which 
was far more difficult than many observers had expected—underlined the great importance of 
the institutional foundations for markets and for good policy.  Fourth, the East Asian 
financial crisis of 1997–98 showed that even where policies had supported rapid growth and 
poverty reduction, weaknesses in institutional and governance foundations could threaten the 
whole edifice of development progress.  
 
What is the core idea behind this new thinking about institutions and governance? Wealthy 
economies developed under a variety of policy regimes, from fairly liberal (Taiwan or the 
United States) to fairly statist (Japan, Sweden). But they all passed a threshold of institutional 
quality that ensured political and economic stability, reasonable state capacity, enforcement 
of property rights and contracts, sufficient provision of public goods, and limits on 
government predation and corruption.  
 
In contrast, many countries with poor institutions and weak governance are beset by poorly 
designed and weakly implemented policies, shoddy infrastructure and public services, and 
state harassment of citizens and business. Legal systems are neither effective nor predictable. 
Contracts are only weakly enforceable. And crime is widespread. Police extract money from 
citizens they are supposed to protect. Public officials steal public funds rather than provide 
public goods. They distribute contracts, licenses, and jobs to their friends and political 
supporters—or sell them outright. And they demand bribes for services, denying the neediest.  
 
Weak institutions are not only an inequitable burden on citizens—they also act as brake on 
economic growth by undermining incentives in the private sector. Businesses in poor 
countries face much larger regulatory burdens than those in rich countries. They face three 
times the administrative costs, and nearly twice as many bureaucratic procedures and longer 
delays. And they have fewer than half the protections of property rights of rich countries. 8 
 
Most of these failings do not show up on standard macroeconomic measures of performance, 
yet they are deeply inimical to development. Societies with weak institutions have not 
developed the basis for complex economic interactions; they have neither the software nor 
the hardware for development. The result is dysfunctional markets, weak competitive 
pressures, and private sectors dependent on government cronyism and corruption. Incentives 
are misaligned, so that entrepreneurial individuals “invest” their time and resources in 
competing for rents from the political system. Social norms form around clientelism, rent-
seeking, and factional competition, rather than social cohesion and progress. These 
destructive norms become rational for the individual, despite their negative collective effect, 
and they often prove difficult to unravel.  
 
The breakdown in governance, erosion of institutions, and collapse of social cohesion are 
typically associated with a radical decline in living standards and rise in inequality—as in 
Moldova, the Caucasus, and Central Asia in the post-Soviet transition period. Heavy 
regulation and weak property rights exclude the poor from doing business.  
 
The institutions of developed economies vary greatly, whether in regulation, social protection 
or labor markets. Even the meta-institution of democratic governance does not have 
unambiguous effects. The formal institutions of democracy do not always ensure checks on 
weak governance. Nor are these checks always absent in authoritarian regimes. Contrasting 
experiences in less democratic East Asian countries in the 1970s and more democratic 
African ones in the 1990s illustrate that mechanisms of accountability can take varying 
forms, defying a simple classification of formal political institutions. Not only are successful 
institutions highly varied in structure, but their origins are complex as well. Institutions are 
highly endogenous: they are not easily manipulated by governments as exogenous levers, but 
instead arise and evolve in historical contexts. These factors make the analysis of institutions 
a great challenge, one that development studies have just begun to grapple with seriously. But 
the recognition of the central role of institutions and governance itself marks a major advance 
in development thinking (Dethier 1999).  
 
2.4  From the “Washington Consensus” to Country Specific Approaches 
 
With the dogmas of the state-market debate came an insistence on “monocausal” 
explanations of development. This led to one-size-fits-all policy approaches, as the general 
models left little room for actual conditions. When mainstream development thinking 
discarded one model in favor of another, the result was too often major changes in policy 
recommendations without room for nuance. The most recent (although certainly not most 
simplistic) manifestation of this was the “Washington Consensus” at the beginning of the 
1990s. Its list of preconditions for growth encapsulated many neoliberal precepts in what was 
often interpreted as a neat recipe for development. Perhaps unfairly, that Consensus came to 
stand for a package of measures aimed largely at getting the government out of the 
economy—and it was applied with excessive uniformity across countries. 
Common sense tells us that no one approach will work everywhere, since the binding 
constraints to development are unlikely to be the same across countries. Development theory 
is catching up with this view. Even under the simpler earlier models, outcomes of policies 
depended on the parameters assumed for a given country. But the case for country specificity 
received a boost in the late 1980s and 1990s, as a flowering of theoretical work on new 
multiple-equilibrium and endogenous-growth models emphasized initial conditions.  
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Take trade restrictions and import-substituting industrialization. The new pragmatic 
consensus now justifiably advocates more liberal trade regimes for most countries—but 
recognizes that the costs of following an import-substitution industrialization strategy varied 
with the country’s characteristics. In large economies with access to foreign technology and 
equipment, competition and economies of scale moderated the inefficiency cost of trade 
restrictions. At least in earlier decades, India, China, and Brazil were able to develop 
manufacturing with fairly closed domestic economies, and some became internationally 
competitive. But in small countries such as Jamaica, Sri Lanka, and Uruguay in the 1960s 
and 1970s, the market was too small, and any benefits of inward-looking industrialization 
were swamped by the costs. Sri Lanka began to grow only after it turned toward export-
oriented policies in 1977.  
 
Institutional variation also shapes policy outcomes. In Japan during the Meiji period, and 
more recently in Korea, public institutions narrowed interest-group pressures, at least enough 
that they did not block development. Public enterprises were run efficiently and built capacity 
in sectors that paved the way for private investment. While governments played a role in 
allocating credit and foreign exchange, they did so more heavily on the basis of performance 
than is typical in other countries. But in Bolivia, Zambia, and other countries, where public 
enterprises and allocations were captured and used for patronage, the same strategies 
undermined industrialization.  
 
Country specificity means that the key is addressing the binding constraints for growth at the 
right time in the right way, not adopting any one-size-fits-all policy packages. Identifying the 
most binding constraints and the best policy mechanisms to overcome them certainly is not 
obvious, putting a premium on sound analysis and the ability to experiment. Much remains to 
be done in this area.  
 
2.5  Globalization & the Transmission of Financial Instability 
 
The 1980s are known as the “lost development decade” because a number of developing 
countries affected by the oil shocks of the 1970s then the debt crisis experienced major 
setbacks.  The crises of the 1990s and 2000s highlight the importance of prudent 
macroeconomic management, whether to control booms or to reduce vulnerabilities. 
Development policy has had to adapt to the deepening of cross-country interdependencies—
to what is usually called “globalization.” Economic integration on a grand scale is nothing 
new: cross-border flows of labor and capital in the 19
th and early 20
th centuries were 
impressively large, with European bond investors financing much of the railroad 
infrastructure in the Americas, to take one example. But the recent globalization trends are 
exceptional in three main ways. First, the costs of transporting goods across borders are now 
far lower, which thanks to trade liberalization has boosted trade flows at rates far faster than 
global income growth. Second, information, including new technologies, now flows 
instantaneously around the globe, in quantities unimagined in earlier decades. Third, as 
demonstrated during the present global crisis, portfolio capital can now move extremely 
rapidly into and out of a larger number of emerging markets, in response to changes in local 
conditions or investor sentiment.  
 
These changes offer new opportunities to developing countries, for example by allowing 
them to become integrated into global production chains. But they also bring new risks and 
vulnerabilities, particularly to poor countries. Stronger links between economies mean that 10 
 
shocks in industrialized or rapidly growing countries can be transmitted to smaller countries 
less well-equipped to cope with them. The ripple effects of the East Asian and Russian crises 
of the late 1990s and the financial crisis of 2008-2009 demonstrated this all too well. 
Similarly, trade and aid can benefit poor countries, but unexpected drops in either—perhaps 
caused by economic decline in rich countries or new waves of protectionism—will have 
destabilizing effects on their economies. Such shocks could drag many poor countries back 
below the threshold of sustainable debt. Poor countries also suffer from migration barriers 
and credit constraints that keep unskilled labor from flowing out, while highly educated 
people exit freely and in large numbers. 
 
Globalization brings other public ills. Among them is the damage that economic growth 
inflicts on the environment, both in developed and developing countries, particularly through 
greenhouse gas emissions. Breaches in security are also being felt as a global public bad, and 
the imbalance of global development has been blamed for it. It is certainly difficult to trace 
all international security problems directly to economic development issues, but the links are 
obvious in several instances: national conflicts spilling over to neighbors and forcing foreign 
intervention, and failed states threatening global stability.   
 
2.6  Aid Effectiveness 
 
Does aid promote development, and if so, under what circumstances? The large literature on 
these questions before the mid-1990s (which consisted mostly in cross-country regression-
based assessments of the role of aid) was particularly inconclusive: while some studies found 
no impact, others found that aid generally fostered growth. But since the late 1990s, 
empirical studies by researchers from the World Bank and elsewhere have laid out a more 
nuanced position. On average, aid spurs growth and poverty reduction in countries with 
better institutions and policies, but it is squandered in poor policy and institutional 
environments.  
 
In 1998 the Bank published its influential Policy Research Report, Assessing Aid, which 
developed this logic and argued that foreign aid would have a greater impact on poverty 
reduction if it were focused on poor countries with stronger economic institutions and 
policies. The recognition that the effects of aid depended heavily on the environment was a 
major step forward. While this empirical judgment has not gone unchallenged by other 
researchers, new studies also tend to find a beneficial effect of aid, differing primarily on 
how much the beneficial results depend on the environment. On this point, case-study 
evidence seems more consistent with the Assessing Aid argument.  
 
A second major advance has been the recognition that successful development assistance 
requires a conducive political economy in the recipient country. The failure of many 
structural adjustment programs in the 1980s, whether because of flawed design or poor 
implementation, underlined the country ownership of reforms. Empirical evidence suggested 
strongly that conditions on loans—that is, promises of future reforms—were far less reliable 
as guides to the borrower’s reform commitment than past actions. As a result, the extensive 
use of conditionality fell out of favor with development thinkers.
  New studies provided 
evidence that aid was highly fungible: foreign aid to one sector often had the effect of 
financing investments in another sector on the margin, because the recipient government 
could redeploy its own resources from the first sector to the second, undermining the intent of 
the donor. For development assistance to make a positive contribution, therefore, it was 11 
 
necessary that the broader public expenditure program be consistent with development aims. 
It no longer sufficed to ensure that a single project was well designed and implemented. 
 
Both advances in thinking would have the effect of shifting development resources from 
countries with poor policies, institutions, and governance to those with better environments 
for growth. While this strategy had strong economic justification, it raised a troubling 
question: what could the development community do to help the hundreds of millions of 
people living in the countries with the poorest aid environments? More recent work has 
begun to address that question, and while it is too early to assess whether that work will bear 
fruit, merely putting the question squarely on the development research agenda is a major 
advance.  
 
One reason why aid is often not effective is because the donor community has no evidence 
about which policies really work in a given economic, social and political setting. “Donors 
are shooting in the dark because they refuse to collect solid evidence on what works,” says 
Angus Deaton. Impact evaluation is aimed at changing that.  For many academic researchers, 
aid effectiveness is synonymous with randomized evaluation or evaluation using quasi-
experimental methods.  Impact evaluation differs from the internal evaluation efforts carried 
out at the World Bank by various units, including QAG (quality at entry) and IEG (ex post 
evaluation).
6
Development involves know-how and practical knowledge that borrows from universal forms 
of knowledge (like economics and the social sciences) but depends heavily on local 
experience and history.  It is not knowledge that can be reproduced at will by the state or a 
technical agency as emphasized by social scientists like Jim Scott (1998) or Charles Sabel 
(2005).  The more successful development experiences (Japan, Korea, South East Asia, 
  While the latter evaluate processes, assess whether projects have reached their 
intended objectives and document changes in specific outcomes, impact evaluations carried 
out in other parts of the Bank evaluate the development impact of the project on the 
population (e.g., on poverty or health outcomes) by comparing the observed outcomes to a 
counterfactual (i.e., what the situation would have been if the program had not been 
undertaken). Impact evaluations are a scientific means of establishing causal links between 
interventions and outcomes and constitute a key input to determining cost-effective 
approaches to development.  Aid can be much more effective if we base our policies on such 
rigorous methods.   
 
Box 2.  The Chinese Approach to Development:  Pragmatism and Gradual Reform 
 
In the Marshall lectures he delivered at Cambridge University, the Chief Economist of the World Bank states that 
“political wisdom derived from Chinese culture—shishiqiushi  (finding truth from the facts), jiefangsixiang 
(freeing one’s mind from dogmatism) and yushijujin (adapting to the changing environment)—can be relevant to 
reform-minded governments in other developing and transitional countries.”  The experience of China 
convincingly demonstrates that during a gradual reform  process, “the government should not have a 
predetermined, grand blueprint. Instead, it should follow a diagnostic approach, finding out the most crucial 
binding constraints on incentives and resource allocation and introducing reform measures that are effective but 
which can be regarded as ‘half-way measures’ by market fundamentalists. In the process, the government should 
encourage and pay attention to local and private initiatives in institutional innovations—as demonstrated 
convincingly by the experiences in China.”  
 
Source: Justin Yifu Lin 2009. 
 
                                                 
6  QAG stands for Quality Assurance Group and IEG for Independent Evaluation Group. 12 
 
China) and the more successful transition experiences (Eastern Europe, China again) have 
involved importing and transplanting useful policy lessons from the West, adapting them to 
local circumstances and undergoing a learning process in which the experience of the local 
population was critical.  
3  The Organization of World Bank Research  
 
Throughout its history, the Bank has gone through several reorganizations that have affected 
not only the administrative structure of research, but also the relationship between research 
and operations, and the way research priorities are set. In addition to institutional 
reorganizations, the Bank’s research program has itself been reviewed and reorganized at 
several other junctures leading to new priorities and new means of achieving them (World 
Bank 1990). 
 
The basic nature and direction of research at the Bank is set by the overall institutional 
mandate and by the institutional structure established to manage research. The clearest 
articulation of the Bank’s research (and policy) priorities is the departmental and divisional 
structure in those parts of the institution responsible for research. For instance, the fact that 
the Bank created an Environmental Department in 1987 does not mean that, prior to 1987, 
the Bank had no interest in environmental issues; but it means that senior management 
decided in 1987 to heighten the Bank’s commitment to such issues.  A key lesson from Bank 
experience is that setting research priorities in the absence of an administrative mechanism to 
serve those priorities seldom produces results. 
 
There are important exceptions to the notion that departmental and divisional structures 
dictate the Bank’s research agenda. Many issues faced by the Bank and its member countries 
do not easily lend themselves to compartmentalization. Poverty is a clear example, private 
sector development another. For these cross-cutting issues, Bank research management must 
coordinate the activities of several departmental or divisional units through its senior 
management structure. Improving the Bank’s ability to undertake such “matrix management” 
was one of the central rationales for the formation of the Policy, Planning and Research 
(which became the Policy, Research and External Affairs) complex at the time of the 1987 
reorganization, and for the creation of the Networks during the 1997 reorganization. 
 
The amount of research undertaken in broad subject areas at the Bank depends in large part 
on the resources the institution chooses to devote to those areas. However, within each 
subject area there remains considerable leeway in terms of what topics will be researched.  
Even the Bank can undertake research on only a fraction of all interesting and potentially 
high payoff research areas. Some mechanism is, therefore, needed to ensure that divisional 
and departmental research efforts are devoted to areas with the highest potential policy 
payoff. This is not an easy matter because research is by its nature a highly uncertain 
undertaking.  
Over the years, the Bank has used a number of mechanisms to set research priorities, or, 
more accurately, to ensure that research is serving institutional priorities. Key actors in this 
process have been the Vice Presidents responsible for research, the Research Committee in 
its various avatars, and the Bank's Research Administrator, again in various guises.    13 
 
Box 3.  Development Research at the World Bank:  Brief Chronology 
 
1946  Eugene Meyer becomes President of the World Bank and the Bank begins its Operations. 
  Leonard Rist is appointed Research Director, and Paul Rosenstein-Rodan Assistant Director. 
1952  First major reorganization of the Bank. 
1960  The International Development Association (IDA) is established. 
1963  George Woods becomes President and Irving Friedman Economic Advisor to the President with the 
rank of Vice President. 
1968   Robert McNamara becomes President.  
1971  Central research program formally established and Research Committee created. Since then (except 
during 1982-87), the RC sets research priorities—through  sectoral  reviews—and channels resources to 
research activities. 
1972  Major reorganization of the World Bank. Vice Presidency for Development Policy created, headed by 
Hollis Chenery.  Research comes under the aegis of the Development Policy Staff.  
1977  External evaluation of research by Sir Arthur Lewis.  
1982  A.W. Clausen becomes President. Development Policy Staff becomes Economics Research Staff, 
with Anne Krueger as VP for Research. Resources for research are shifted toward operations. Funding 
decisions made by REPAC, chaired by the Research Administrator. 
1983  External evaluation of research by Assar Lindbeck.   
1987  Barber Conable becomes President.   Reorganization: David Hopper is Senior VP, Policy Planning 
and Research  (later Policy, Research and External Affairs) followed by Wilfried Thalwitz in 1989;     
V. Rajagopalan is VP for Policy Research & External Affairs (now Operations Policy Staff).          
Stanley Fischer is Chief Economist and VP for Research (until 1990).  
1988  REPAC is replaced by a reconstituted Research Committee.  
1991  Lewis Preston becomes President.  Lawrence Summers becomes Chief Economist.  
1992  Nancy Birdsall creates a Research  Department combining all sectors (and mirroring  the  Networks 
created later). 
1993  Michael Bruno becomes Chief Economist (He passes away in 1996) and Lyn Squire Research Director. 
1995  James Wolfensohn becomes President. 
1997  The Bank is reorganized and adopts a matrix structure. The Networks are created. 
  Joe Stiglitz becomes Chief Economist.   
1998  Paul Collier becomes Research Director. 
2000  Nicholas Stern becomes Chief Economist and Senior VP. 
2003  François Bourguignon succeeds Nick Stern in October 2003, and Alan Winters Research Director.   
2005  Paul Wolfowitz becomes President. 
2006  External evaluation of research by a panel chaired by Angus Deaton. 
2007  Robert Zoellick becomes President in July 2007, Wolfowitz having resigned. 
  François Bourguignon retires in October 2007.   Martin Ravallion becomes Research Director. 
2008  Justin Lin becomes the Bank’s first Chief Economist and Senior VP from a developing country. 14 
 




In the early days, the Economics or Research Department was responsible for conducting 
financial feasibility studies of proposed projects.
  It was an operational department, co-equal 
with the Loan Department, which negotiated directly with borrowing governments. Soon the 
Loan Department was conducting its own feasibility studies. This left the economists out of 
operations altogether, particularly since the President is said to have paid little attention to 
their economic reports.
8
Conflicts within the Bank between operations and research arose almost as soon as the 
institution was created. Top management was concerned about establishing the Bank’s 
reputation on Wall Street and the rating of its bonds, and followed conservative financial 




The Economics Department was recreated during the presidency of George Woods (1963-68) 
and substantially increased in size and importance. Irving Friedman was brought to the Bank 
from the International Monetary Fund as Economic Advisor to the President with the rank of 
Vice President, and Andrew Kamarck became Director of the Economics Department. 
Friedman and Kamarck had worked on the Bretton Woods proposals at one time or another 
within the United States government, and had expertise in both theoretical and applied 
economics.
, in spite 
of the thinking emerging intellectual circles regarding causal relationships between 
developmental and social change and equity. It maintained this position until the second half 
of the 1960s but it was faced with a growing disappointment within the development 
community with the dominant model of development that the Bank had embraced.  
In 1952, a major reorganization created three area departments and a new technical 
Operations or Project Department responsible for conducting feasibility studies. The 
Economics Department as such disappeared, although a small staff of economists continued 
to do general research, among other things, about creditworthiness. 
 
10
                                                 
7  Research at the World Bank before 1971 is analyzed in Michele Alacevich  2009; Louis Galambos and David 
Milobsky 1995; and Edward S. Mason and Robert E. Asher 1973. 
 
8  This account follows Oliver 1975 which tells the story of Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Assistant Director of the 
Economics Department at that time (Leonard Rist was Director). One of the “founding fathers” of development 
economics, he enunciated the theory of the Big Push: no single project in a low-income country is likely to be 
profitable by itself, for the domestic market is too small, the suppliers too backward, the transportation and 
communication facilities too costly. Only if many projects are put in place more or less simultaneously can an 
economy leap from underdeveloped to developing. Rosenstein-Rodan argued that it is useless for the Bank to be 
preoccupied with creditworthiness and individual projects. It should calculate the aid necessary to sustain a 
desired growth rate calculated from an assumed capital-output ratio and make massive loans on a continuing 
basis.  This advice seemed like nonsense to bankers and lawyers in the Bank. Rosenstein-Rodan  lost the battle 
and  retreated  to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where his influence expanded greatly: he became an 
adviser to the Alliance for Progress, to the governments of India, Italy, Chile, and the United States and to 
various Presidents of the World Bank since that time. Many of his ideas came eventually to be accepted in the 
Bank, but not for some time.  
 
9  See Alacevich 2009. 
 
 
10 According to Oliver (1975), Woods was eager to transform the Bank from a bank to a development finance 
agency and felt that he needed the assistance of an economics staff in order to do that. He is reported to have 15 
 
 
In four years, Friedman and Kamarck recruited over 200 social scientists, mainly Ph.D. 
economists, and sought additionally to have economic analysis carried out within area 
departments as well as the Economics Department.  This practice was also followed after the 
reorganization of 1971 and is ongoing today.  Friedman was not only Director of the 
Economic Research Department, but also Economic Adviser to the President—indeed he was 
George Woods’ principal adviser—and these have been the combined duties of the Bank’s 
Chief Economist since that time.   
 
3.2  The 1971-1982 Period 
 
In 1970 Friedman was succeeded by Hollis Chenery, a leading Harvard economist who had 
been assistant administrator for the program of the United States Agency for International 
Development, and the work of the research economists in the Bank turned more toward 
quantitative analysis.  
 
Chenery was particularly influential in advising McNamara on how to promote the 
redistribution of income in developing countries so as to reduce the crushing burden of 
absolute poverty and that, “in general, Bank economists have become leading contributors to 
development research, and the Bank is better able on that account to deal with the 
development priorities of the world.” (Oliver 1975). In particular, writes Oliver, “the work of 
the Bank today is measured more in terms of the successful development of member 
countries than of the number of projects approved, the lack of defaults on past loans, or the 
rate of return on equity. And development itself is measured not only in terms of rising real 
gross national product but in improved public health, more equitable income distribution, 
declining rates of population growth, and greater political stability.” 
 
The Bank’s current approach to research began in the early 1970s when the Bank’s central 
research program was formally established—around the time when President McNamara 
sharpened the Bank’s focus on poverty reduction.
  In his 1970 speech to the Board of 
Governors in Copenhagen, the President of the Bank addressed the question of what needed 
to be known to be able to do good lending and advisory work in developing countries: 
11
                                                                                                                                                 
said, “I don't think you can have a development agency unless it has as its fuselage the loans which are being 
made, but one wing has to be project work and the other wing has to be economics.”  
 




We do not want simply to say that rising unemployment is a “bad thing,” and something 
must be done about it. We want to know its scale, its causes, its impact and the range of 
policies and options which are open to governments, international agencies and the private 
sector to deal with it.  We do not want simply to sense that the “green revolution” requires a 
comparable social revolution in the organization and education of the smaller farmer. We 
want to know what evidence or working models are available on methods of cooperative 
enterprise, of decentralized credit systems, of smaller-scale technology, and of price and 
market guarantees. We do not want simply to deplore over-rapid urbanization in the 
primary cities. We want the most accurate and careful studies of internal migration, town-




3.2.1  Organizational Change & Management of Research 
 
In the fall of 1972, the Bank underwent a major reorganization. It created a new 
administrative structure for the Bank, dividing operations into 15 areas of specialization. 
Most sectoral issues related to the 15 areas of specialization were the responsibility of the 
Central Projects Staff (CPS), while most broad questions of development policy were to be 
addressed by the Development Policy Staff (DPS), known as the “Economics Department,” 
which was given responsibility for macroeconomic research. A senior vice presidency of 
operations was created with five regional vice presidents and a vice president for project 
staff. Vice presidencies were also created for Development Policy; Finance; Organization 
Planning and Personnel Management; and General Counsel. Hollis Chenery became the first 
Vice President for Development Policy.
 12
The External Research Budget was managed by a Research Adviser (later called 
Administrator), assisted by the Secretary to the Research Committee, from the Office of the 
Vice President, Development Policy.
 
 
A Research Committee was established in April 1971 to advise the President in shaping the 
Bank’s research program (following a comprehensive review of the Bank’s research program 
by Bela Balassa). The 15 sectoral operational units and other divisions of the Bank were to 
submit research priorities annually to the Research Committee. A separate budget for 
research was introduced in the Bank in FY72. It was described as the External Research 
Budget and later became known as the Research Support Budget.  
 
13
One of the most important forces driving research during the 1970s was the institutional 
mandate, outlined in Mr. McNamara’s 1973 Nairobi address, to reduce absolute poverty 
worldwide. This Bankwide goal pressured the Research Committee to promote research 
projects aimed at improving  understanding of the causes of poverty and the search for policy 
options for poverty reduction. 
  The first annual report on research sent to the Board 
was issued in 1973 (World Bank 1973).  This report, which for the first time identifies the 
four objectives of the Bank’s research program, informs about the External Research Budget.  
Thus, during the 1972-82 period, the Bank’s Research Committee served as an advisory 
panel to Hollis Chenery, who, as Vice President for Development Policy, directed the Bank’s 
economic research. Substantial authority rested with Mr. Chenery, who worked closely with 
then President Robert McNamara to shape the Bank’s research program.  
                                                 
12  A year before this reorganization, in 1971, the Central Economics Staff, reporting to Hollis Chenery, had been 
reorganized into three units: the Economics Department (with David Henderson as Director, and Alexander 
Stevenson as Deputy Director); the Economic Program Department; and the Development Research Center. The 
new Economic Program Department was to support and review the area departments’ country economic analyses 
and programs, and to advise on the policy issues that emerge from them. The department encompassed five 
divisions: Domestic Finance, Socio-Economic Data, International Finance, Program Review, and the 
Comparative Analysis and Projections Division. Benjamin King was appointed as Senior Adviser to the 
Economic Program Department. The Development Research Center (formerly the Basic Research Center) was to 
undertake economic research closely linked to Bank Group activities, and to coordinate with the work of other 
research organizations in the field of development outside the Bank.  Louis Goreux continued as Director of the 
Center.  
 
13   Operational Manual 1.50 of August 1974. 
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3.2.2  Core Objectives of Bank Research & the Sectoral Review 
 
When the research program was formalized in 1971, senior management gave it several basic 
objectives which remain intact to this day: 
 
 (a) To support all aspects of the Bank’s operations, including the assessment of 
development progress in member countries 
(b) To broaden understanding of the development process 
(c) To improve the Bank’s capacity to provide advice to member countries 
(d) To assist in developing indigenous research capacity in member countries. 
Although these goals underscore the philosophy of Bank Research, they were, and remain, 
broad objectives that provide limited guidance at the program and project level. A number of 
mechanisms evolved over time to move from these broad objectives to specific work 
programs and projects and it is to these that we now turn. 
Between 1971 and 1979, the 15 departments (operational units) of the Bank submitted 
research priorities to the Research Committee, which served as an advisory panel to Hollis 
Chenery who, as Vice President for Development Policy, directed economic research and, 
working closely with President McNamara, shaped the Bank’s research program.  
The specific mechanism used during this era to set priorities was the sectoral review. Each 
sector was required to submit to the Research Committee a plan indicating its priorities and 
overall agenda for research. These plans and reviews were carried out on an ad hoc basis. 
Periodically, the Research Committee would pull together the results of all the sectoral 
reviews and use them as a basis for preparing guidelines for Bank research. 
3.2.3  The General Research Advisory Panel 
By 1975-1977, the process of having each sector division create annual plans had become a 
cumbersome and time-consuming way for the Research Committee to set priorities. Some 
annual plans were well done and objective. Many, however, became little more than 
rationalizations by which divisions competed for funding from the central research budget. 
As a consequence, in 1977 an external review of the research program undertaken by Sir 
Arthur Lewis was organized to help the Committee and Mr. Chenery develop a defensible 
and cohesive work program for the future.  
Six panels conducted reviews of Bank research on topics ranging from agriculture and rural 
development to industrial development and trade. The work of the panels became the input 
into the deliberations of the General Research Advisory Panel (GRAP), whose report went to 
the Board in 1979. 
3.2.3.1 Creation of Research Priorities 
The GRAP shifted responsibility for identifying research priorities from departments to the 
Research Committee, adding RC “steering committees” to guide the design and direction of 
proposals; inform research divisions of the plans, and direct proposals to institutional 
priorities. The GRAP shifted Bank research toward multi-country comparative studies (which 18 
 
was, in a way, the Bank’s comparative advantage) and collaborative research with member 
countries to “stimulate indigenous research capability” and encourage more active research 
dissemination.   
The GRAP changed the process by which research priorities were set by eliminating the 
annual divisional planning but continued the role of the Research Committee as an advisory 
group for Mr. Chenery. The GRAP also reaffirmed the Bank research mandates outlined in 
1971 but suggested a change in areas of emphasis for Bank-sponsored research. For example, 
it argued that the Bank should more actively exploit its comparative advantage in undertaking 
multi-country comparative studies. The GRAP report also encouraged Bank research 
managers to promote collaborative research with member countries in an effort to stimulate 
indigenous research capability. In addition, it argued that the Bank should pursue a more 
active dissemination strategy for the results of Bank research both inside and outside the 
Bank. 
In an effort to increase the effectiveness of the Research Committee in shaping Bank 
research, the GRAP also recommended that the Research Committee establish a series of 
sub-committees to help guide project sponsors in the preparation and presentation of their 
projects to the full Committee. In principle, a major objective of these “steering committees,” 
as they were called, was to help those submitting projects to the Research Committee tailor 
those projects to the institution’s research priorities of that program. Steering committees 
often held several hearings on a project before it reached the full Committee to provide 
managers with guidance on the design and direction of their projects and to inform divisional 
researchers of the Research Committee’s goals. From 1979 to 1982, the steering committees 
replaced sectoral reviews as the key mechanism for directing research toward priority areas. 
3.2.3.2 Improved Dissemination of Bank Research: The World Development Report 
The most important vehicle to disseminate the Bank’s views on development, to mobilize 
official development assistance and to win adherence for a renewed push for development is 
the annual World Development Report, which appeared for the first time in 1978.  As 
described by Shahid Yusuf (2008), the intense interest aroused by a paper on global trends 
and the prospects for developing countries issued in 1974 by Hollis Chenery encouraged 
McNamara to pursue the idea of an annual publication that took the pulse of the international 
economy, stimulated the search for answers, and synthesized the consensus view.  A team 
comprised of the Bank’s “best and brightest” led by Chenery was assigned the task of 
assessing the state of the world economy and, in broad strokes, indicating the essentials of a 
strategy for growth that was equitably shared. The first World Development Report, a slim 
volume with just 68 pages of text, appeared in August 1978.  In McNamara’s words, the 
purpose of the WDR was to provide “a comprehensive assessment of the global development 
issues.”  It was a vehicle for dealing “with a number of fundamental problems confronting 
developing countries and explo[ring] their relationship to the underlying trends in the 
international economy.”  
   19 
 
3.3  The 1982-1987 Period 
In 1982, as A.W. Clausen replaced R. McNamara as President, the Bank was reorganized.  
The Development Policy Staff became the Economics Research Staff (ERS) and, shortly 
thereafter, Anne Krueger became the new Vice President, Economics and Research.  
Research on basic development issues was concentrated within ERS in the Development 
Research Department (DRD). Simultaneously, the Central Projects Staff was reshaped as the 
Operational Policy Staff (OPS) whose mandate was, among other things, to conduct applied 
policy research in close collaboration with operational staff.  
3.3.1  Organizational Change 
Within OPS, the Country Policy Department was to act as the “applied counterpart” of the 
Development Research Department. Within the Economic Research Staff (ERS), the 
Development Research Department (DRD) was responsible for macroeconomic research.  
The Central Projects Staff became known as Operations Policy Staff (OPS) with 
responsibility for research on sectoral and micro topics.  
The new Vice President and her team reorganized research at the Bank. Prior to the 
reorganization, the “economics department” (DPS) accounted for 70 percent of Bank 
research expenditures with the remaining 30 percent being in Operations. The reorganization 
would change this balance radically: after the reorganization, more than one-half of Bank 
research would be located in and managed by departments in Operations. By fiscal 1983, 
research resources were shifted toward operations: research resources controlled by ERS 
dropped to slightly below 50 percent. 
Major reforms were also introduced in how research was administered. The research program 
was managed from the Office of the Vice President. The responsibilities of the Research 
Committee were shifted to two entities: a Research Policy Council at the VP level, which set 
policies and considered the large Comparative Studies proposals, and a Research Proposal 
Review Committee, which reviewed the other, smaller proposals.  The Research Committee 
was soon replaced by the Research Projects Approval Committee and the Bank Research 
Advisory Group (OM 3.50 and 3.51 of March 12, 1984).  A new Office of the Research 
Administrator was established and instructions from the Vice President went out that all 
matters relating to RPC, REPAC, BRAG and the management of the external research budget 
would henceforth be dealt with by the Research Administrator, Deepak Lall (July 6, 1984 
memo from Anne Krueger).  
Research funds were concentrated in a few large cross-country comparative research projects 
with several small projects.  The Research Policy Council also established the Research 
News Bulletin, and the two journals, the World Bank Research Observer and the World Bank 
Economic Review—the news bulletin and the WBRO targeted a wide range of readers 





Box 4.  Research Reform under Anne Krueger 
 
“The reorganization of research in the Bank [which was ongoing in March 1982] is taking place in a broader 
context of the realignment of economic analysis, research and policy activities. The Managing Committee 
recommended a 15 percent reduction in the volume of resources allocated to research, and a major shift in the 
locus of management of research. Prior to the reorganization by far the largest share of research was conducted 
within DPS [i.e., the “economics department”]. […] The DPS accounted for about 70 percent of total Bank 
research expenditures during FY81, with the remaining 30 percent being in Operations. The reorganization will 
change this balance radically: after the reorganization, over one half of Bank research will be located in and 
managed by departments in Operations.” By fiscal 1983, research resources were shifted toward operations: 
research resources controlled by ERS dropped to slightly below 50 percent. 
 
The March 1983 report states that “…there are three main considerations underlying the present reassessment of 
research priorities. The first is that which motivated the reorganization: the need to adjust the portfolio of 
research towards applied research containing more research projects which have relatively rapid applications to 
policy and operations. The second consideration underlying reassessment is a growing perception of the 
importance of a better understanding of the context within which development and economic activity occur. This 
leads in turn to increased emphasis on research on the international economy as the context for domestic 
economic policy, to increased emphasis on sectoral and national economy interactions, and to the study of 
sectoral policies which provide the setting for efficient project operations. A third consideration is that the 
Bank’s comparative advantage in multi-country comparative studies of development policy […] has not been 
fully exploited.”  
 
Sources:  World Bank 1982 (p.21) and World Bank 1983 (p.11) 
 
3.3.2  New Research Priorities 
Under Ms. Krueger, new mechanisms were developed to set research priorities and to carry 
out research in the selected areas. To set research priorities for the Bank Ms. Krueger 
established the Research Policy Council (RPC), a vice-presidential level committee which 
she chaired. The RPC met several times each year to decide on the general direction and 
guidelines for Bank research and to recommend research on specific topics. 
To help in the task of providing guidance to the Bank’s research program, Krueger 
commissioned another assessment of Bank research, this one undertaken by Assar Lindbeck, 
Director of the Institute of International Economics in Stockholm. Professor Lindbeck’s 
report, presented to the Board as part of the 1984 Annual Report on the World Bank 
Research Program, recommended a change in the basic approach and philosophy underlying 
Bank research. In particular, Professor Lindbeck recommended a move away from what he 
characterized as “engineering economics” with its emphasis on large-scale quantitative 
forecasting and planning models, toward studies that emphasized “factual behavioral 
patterns.” Krueger and the RPC endorsed this recommendation and its adoption is evident in 
much of the research funded through the Research Support Budget between 1983 and 1986.  
This shift in orientation mirrored the evolving understanding of the development process that 
took place in the 1980’s more broadly with a heightening sensitivity among policymakers 
regarding implications of government failures faced under highly interventionist regimes, and 
a resulting trend towards policy prescriptions favoring unregulated markets.  In FY84, the 
Research Policy Council, under Ms. Krueger’s chairmanship, recommended that research be 
encouraged in five areas: 21 
 
1.  Costs and benefits of government intervention 
2.  Interrelationships between institutional structures and incentives 
3.  The international economic environment 
4.  The relationship of short-to-medium-term stabilization measures to long-term 
economic development 
5.  Economic planning. 
In November 1986, the report on research submitted to the Board states (p.ii), “As the last 
two years’ Annual Reports have noted, there has been a shift in perceptions about the 
development process…These changing perceptions have informed the guidelines for research 
that the RPC issued three years ago. This shift has implied greater emphasis on research 
oriented more to making policy and less to understanding what would happen in an 
optimizing society where all regulations could be exogenously imposed and costlessly 
enforced; it represents a departure from big modeling enterprises for planning and forecasting 
and a reorientation towards studies of how individuals, institutions and governments behave 
in different economic environments.” 
Just as research during the 1970s had been driven by the institutional mandate to reduce 
world poverty, this new program responded to the Bank’s rapidly growing involvement in 
policy-based lending with its emphasis on macroeconomic adjustment and trade 
considerations. Ms. Krueger chose to disseminate the new priorities for Bank research to the 
staff through the Annual Report on the World Bank Research Program—a practice that 
remains in effect to this day. 
To implement the Lindbeck recommendations, Krueger established the Comparative Studies 
Program, a series of large-scale studies of major development issues, each built on an in-
depth comparative analysis of 20 or so country experiences. The Comparative Studies 
Program dominated the course of centrally funded research for most of the 1983 through 
1987 period and was the principal mechanism used by the RPC to translate research priorities 
into action. Funding decisions on the Comparative Studies Program were made by the RPC 
for the first comparative studies and by the RPC and REPAC (see below) for the fourth and 
last study. 
Other aspects of the Bank’s research program were supported for the most part through a 
series of small grants (generally under $50,000). Funding decisions for projects that fell 
outside the comparative studies program were the responsibility of the Research Proposal 
Approval Committee (REPAC), a committee chaired by the Research Administrator, which 
served in an advisory capacity to Krueger. REPAC’s mandate was narrower than that of its 
predecessor committee (the Research Committee) in that it was not concerned with priority 
setting even in an advisory role but rather with technical review and the implementation of 
RPC-established priorities. 
Reviewing the changes that took place in the Bank’s research agenda during this period, the 
first research report sent by Stanley Fischer to the Board states “The Bank’s research 
program continues to evolve as priorities change and as old projects are completed and new 
ones initiated. During the late 1960s and the 1970s, concern about distributional issues and 
poverty strongly influenced the direction of Bank research. In the early 1980s the Bank found 
itself with a new president, a new vice president for research, a new set of global economic 22 
 
conditions, and a new role in meeting the needs of its members. As interest in policy-based 
lending increased, so too did the demand for research on macroeconomic and international 
issues. Although a large component of the research program continued to be devoted to 
analyzing the problems of the poor and the ways of alleviating poverty, the problems of 
structural adjustment and stabilization generally overtook distributional concerns to become 
the dominant issues facing many of the Bank’s clients.  Four patterns in the makeup of the 
research budget since the early 1980s are noteworthy: (1) the rising share of departmentally 
approved research, (2) the rising share of research on macroeconomic and international 
issues, (3) the move toward small and very large projects, and (4) the scant involvement of 
the regional staff in research.” (World Bank 1988, p.7). 
3.4  The 1987-1992 Period 
 
3.4.1  Organizational Change 
In 1987, as Barber Conable succeeded A.W. Clausen as President, the Bank underwent yet 
another major reorganization.  It produced both a new research management structure and an 
almost completely new research management team.
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In 1987, the research program was managed by the Office of the Research Administrator, 
which was renamed Research Advisory Staff (RAD) in 1988.
 The Policy, Planning & Research 
(PPR) complex was created to integrate policy and research. It encompassed, inter alia, 
Development Economics (DEC), Sector Policy & Research, and Strategic Planning & 
Review, both of which existed prior to 1987.  It also reshaped the structure and size of the 
research program by reintegrating the decentralized structure of the 1982-1987 period in the 
Policy, Planning, and Research (PPR) complex.  
The Research Policy Council was replaced by a Research and Publications Policy Council 
(RPPC), chaired by the Senior Vice President for PPR and the Bank’s Chief Economist. The 
RPPC’s membership was drawn from the ranks of Bank senior managers, principally vice 
presidents, and its mandate was much the same as what the RPC’s had been—to set broad 
priority guidelines for Bank-supported research. The RPPC established a list of non-
restrictive research priorities.   
15
                                                 
14    David Hopper was named Senior VP, Policy Planning and Research, followed, in 1989,  by Wilfried 
Thalwitz.  V. Rajagopalan became VP for Policy Research & External Affairs (later called Operations Policy 
Staff) and Stanley Fischer, VP for Research.  PPR was restructured in FY90 and became Policy, Research and 
External Affairs. 
 
15    The Research Administrator was Dennis de Tray. He was followed by Gregory Ingram (and Shahid 
Yusuf in 1993/94 while Greg Ingram was WDR Director). Prior to 1987, the Research Administrators 
were, successively, Benjamin King, Bela Balassa, Shankar Acharya, John Duloy and Deepak Lall. 
 
 A reconstituted Research 
Committee, chaired by Stan Fischer, replaced the REPAC. The Research Committee’s 
membership was expanded to include broader institutional representation, especially from 
Operations, and its role in setting research priorities was reestablished. It was the main 
operational body for directing and managing research and its mandate was to carry out the 
RPPC’s program for research.  The Committee’s main responsibilities were (1) to assess and 
rule on requests for funding from the centrally administered Research Support Budget; (2) to 23 
 
establish specific research priorities based on guidelines set by the Research and Publications 
Policy Council; and (3) to evaluate existing research by the Bank and others on major policy 
areas in order to identify gaps that future research might fill.  
During this period, three new instruments were created: the Annual Bank Conference on 
Development Economics (ABCDE), the Visiting Research Fellows program and the 
Research Capacity-Building Grants to research institutes in developing countries.  
3.4.2  New Research Priorities 
An informal review of the Bank’s research portfolio and research program was conducted at 
the time of the reorganization by Bela Balassa (who had written the report leading to the 
creation of the Research Committee in 1971).
16
Based on Balassa’s review and their own assessment of the program, RPPC members 
instructed the Bank’s research managers—mainly PPR directors and division chiefs—to 
launch a program to strengthen Bank research in both traditional and new priority areas. For 
FY88, on the advice of Stanley Fischer, who had by then become Vice President, 
Development Economics and Chief Economist, and the Research Committee, the Council 
established a list of non-restrictive research priorities designed to broaden and deepen the 
foundation of research in the Bank and especially to promote research in “special operational 
emphasis” areas. These research priorities were:
 It included a critical evaluation of the 
outcome of the large Comparative Studies Program, as well as recommendations that the 
RSB research project portfolio be “rebalanced” to include fewer very small (under $50,000) 
and very large (over $1,000,000) projects and more medium-size projects in the $200,000- 
$400,000 range.  
17
1.  Human capital and development, including the role of women in development 
 
2.  Institutional and capacity building for the private and public sectors 
3.  Poverty 
4.  Environment 
5.  Macroeconomic policies 
6.  International and domestic trade policies 
7.  International and domestic fluctuations 
8.  Agriculture and industrialization. 
By 1989, a solid base of research in most areas of Bank interest had been reestablished and 
the RPPC and the Research Committee decided to focus the Bank’s research building efforts 
on a more limited set of priorities. To provide input into the process of narrowing research 
priorities, the Research Administrator’s Office organized a retreat on Bank research in May 
1989 involving a wide spectrum of regional and PRE staff, as well as selected policy 
researchers from outside the institution. Based on the retreat’s discussions and on its own 
deliberations, the RPPC chose three topics to receive special emphasis by Bank research 
managers during FY90 and beyond: (1) the environment; (2) the role of private sector 
                                                 
16   Another audit of the Bank’s centrally funded research projects was carried out in FY94.    
 
17  See the FY88 Annual Report on  the World Bank Research Program. 
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activities in economic development; and (3) socialist economies.  In addition, the RPPC 
reaffirmed the Bank’s long-standing commitment to building indigenous capacity for policy 
research in member developing countries.  
 
3.5  1992 to Present 
 
3.5.1  Organizational Structure & Management 
 
In October 1992, thematic Vice Presidencies for policy guidance, operational support and 
dissemination of best practice to operations—the forerunners of the Networks—were 
established.
18
During Nancy Birdsall’s tenure, the Country Economics Department became the 
principal research arm of the World Bank covering the full range of macroeconomic, 
sectoral and microeconomic issues relevant to development policy in the Bank’s member 
countries.  As of February 1993, the department’s name was changed to the Policy 
Research Department (PRD) to reflect this expanded research mandate.  As part of the 
Bank’s reorganization, PRD received responsibility for sectoral research, which was 
previously carried out by departments of the former Sector and Operations Policy Vice 
Presidency.  That led to several changes in the department’s organization – three 
divisions in charge of macro-oriented research remained in place (the transition and 
macro-adjustment division, public economics and trade policy), and three new 
thematically organized divisions were created (poverty and human resources, finance and 
private sector development, and environment, infrastructure and agriculture) to take care 
of the sectoral research.
  Regional Technical Departments were made smaller and the sector operations 
divisions were strengthened.  In 1997, there was a major reorganization and the Bank adopted 
its current “matrix structure.”  Six Networks were established to bring sectoral expertise, 
multi-country experience and research to bear on operations and policies.  In 2006, the Bank 
consolidated the six Networks into four.   
 
Research was consolidated under the Chief Economist and Vice President for Development 
Economics and the new Vice Presidency became known as Development Economics 
(abbreviated “DEC”). Michael Bruno was appointed Vice President in September 1993, 
replacing Lawrence Summers, who left the Bank in January 1993. DEC had responsibility for 
micro and macro-economic research and conducted a significant share of sectoral studies, 
and the Policy Research Department became the principal research arm of the Bank.   
19
                                                 
18    In 1992, the Vice Presidency for Sector and Operations Policy (OSP) was replaced by three new vice 
presidencies: Human Resources Development and Operations Policy (HRO), headed by Armeane Choksi; 
Finance and Private Sector Development (FPD), headed by Jean-Francois Rischard; and Environmentally 
Sustainable Development (ESD), headed by Ismail Serageldin.  
 
  Thus was born the Research Department, which combined all 
aspects of development and—after 1997—mirrored the Networks that would be created in 
19    At the end of FY92, the Socialist Economies Reform Unit was merged with the Macroeconomics and 
Growth Division to create a stronger focus for both macroeconomic and microeconomic work on socialist 
transformation. Two further organizational changes took place in PRD during FY94.  In May 1994 the Trade 
Policy division moved from PRD to the International Economics Department, and the Transition and Macro-




the operational side of the Bank.  The share of DEC in total research expenditures increased 
sharply.   
Research Directors in PRD/DECRG since 1992 
 
  Nancy Birdsall    (PRD)    1991-1993 
  Lyn Squire     (PRD)    1993-1996 
  Paul Collier      (DECRG)  1998-2003 
  Alan Winters    (DECRG)  2004-2007 
  Martin Ravallion   (DECRG)  since Sept 2007 
 
The Vice Presidency, headed by the Chief Economist, had five departments.  The Research 
Group (DECRG)—with 86 full-time researchers in 2005 but only 75 in 2008—is by far the 
largest one.  DECRG is the Bank’s only department dedicated to research, with a mandate 
covering all regions and sectors. It carries out empirical and evaluative studies, collects and 
analyzes primary data and develops operational tools.  DECRG is organized by themes and 
currently consists of six teams (poverty; public services; macroeconomics & growth; trade 
policy; environment; rural development).  The other five departments are the Data Group 
which produces the World Development Indicators and manages the Bank’s Development 
Data Platform; the Prospects Group, in charge of economic forecasts (which publishes 
annually Global Economic Prospects and Global Development Finance); the World 
Development Report Group (changing every year, based on the new WDR topic) and the 
Operations and Strategy Group (DECOS), created in 2009, which combines policy review 
and various research services.  DECOS combines the functions of the Policy Review Group 
and the Research Advisory Staff—both now extinct.  The Policy Review Group was 
established in DEC in FY94 with designated staff from PRD and IEC to review adjustment 
operations and country review papers.  The Research Advisory Staff (which was a separate 
unit, at the same level as IEC, the International Economics, and PRD, the Policy Research 
Department, before 1997) was subsumed under DEC and changes were made in the 
management of the Research Support Budget. Until 1999, the RSB was independent from the 
rest of DEC in the sense that DEC managers did not participate in RSB discussions and the 
budget was managed separately from DEC’s budget—although, of course, the Research 
Administrator had frequent direct communications with the Chief Economist. Starting in 
1999, the RSB was integrated into DEC’s budget and DECRA (successor to the Research 
Administrator’s Office) relied on DEC for budget reporting and analysis.
20
3.5.2  Research Dissemination 
 
   
 
Dissemination and outreach efforts began in earnest in the late 1980s.  The Policy Research 
Working Paper series, intended to encourage the exchange of ideas on development and 
quickly disseminate the findings of research in progress, started in March 1988. CEC 
continued to publish CEC Outreach targeted to regional staff and to invite staff from outside 
DEC to spend 6 to 18 months as CEC fellows (this was the forerunner of the Visiting 
Research Fellowship program).  A Transition Newsletter was started during Nancy Birdsall’s 
                                                 
20  A management audit of DECRA and the Research Support Budget (called “review of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the process to achieve RSB’s objective of supporting research by staff”) was commissioned by 
Nick Stern in the fall of 2002.  Subsequently DECRA was split into two new units responsible, respectively, for 
the RSB (DECRS) and partnerships and conferences (DECPO). 26 
 
tenure.  Lyn Squire, who was the team leader for the 1990 World Development Report on 
poverty and had become PRD Director in October 1993, stated (in the FY94 PRD Annual 
Report) that his priority as director was to improve dissemination of its findings to Bank staff 
and the wider development community.              
 
Several promising research dissemination and outreach initiatives were launched.  PRD 
launched its own Internet homepage (what later became  www.econ.worldbank.org) in 1994. 
It also established a telephone referral service for Bank staff seeking the department’s 
operational support (with Klaus Deininger answering the phone); although this service was 
consuming too much skilled staff time and had to be discontinued.  PRD also organized in 
1994 a “research fair,” which gave Bank staff an opportunity to discuss with PRD researchers 
areas of common interest and concern.  Similar fairs were organized at the Annual Meetings 
in 1995 and in Japan, in cooperation with Japanese development institutions.  Other 
dissemination initiatives followed, with major extensions of DEC’s web presence with 
regular online stories with research themes and a “web-alert system” for notable Policy 
Research Working Papers introduced in 2005.  In 2005, Alan Winters resumed the practice 
(dropped during Paul Collier’s tenure) of reporting annually on DECRG’s activities with the 
publication of Research Highlights. In 2006, François Bourguignon created the World Bank 
Research Digest reporting on Bank research findings on a quarterly basis.  In response to 
demand for support to economic research institutions in transition countries, the Research 
Committee expanded its research capacity-building activities during the 1990s.  A number of 
Research Capacity Building Grants were financed using RSB funds (which were not 
originally intended for that purpose).  
 
Policy Research Reports published by PRD / DEC 
 
1992  The East Asian Miracle    
1993  Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead     
1994  Averting the Old Age Crisis     
1995  Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government Ownership     
1996  Private Capital Flows    
1997  Confronting AIDS: Public Priorities in a Global Epidemic   
1998  Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why?     
1999   Greening Industry: New Roles for Communities, Markets and Governments     
2000  Trade Blocs     
2000  Engendering Development      
2001  Finance for Growth: Policy Choices in a Volatile World     
2001  Globalization, Growth and Poverty: Building an Inclusive World Economy    
2003  Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy     
2003  Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction     
2004  Reforming Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation, and Competition     
2005  At Loggerheads? Agricultural Expansion, Poverty and Environment in the 
Tropical Forests    
2007  Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls in Expanding Access    
2009  Conditional Cash Transfers   
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The practice of publishing synthetic reports aimed at summarizing research findings to 
provide the basis for sound policy advice on specific topics—in due course, these reports 
became known as Policy Research Reports (PRRs)—started in FY92 in the Country 
Economics Department.  The first two reports were The East Asian Miracle and Adjustment 
in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead, both carried out under the general direction 
of Nancy Birdsall.  The third report, Averting the Old Age Crisis, was initiated by Lawrence 
Summers and Nancy Birdsall and carried out under the general direction of Michael Bruno 
and Lyn Squire.  Since then, fourteen more reports have been published. 
 
3.5.3  A Growing Emphasis on Policy-relevant Research 
 
As far as the “marching orders” of the PRD/DEC researchers are concerned, in 1995 already, 
Lyn Squire had insisted that every research program should meet two crucial tests. First, each 
program must be rigorous and achieve the highest analytical and empirical standards.  
Second, each program must have the potential for significant development impact: it must 
seek answers that can be incorporated into the Bank’s lending strategies, project design and 
implementation, and, ultimately, in the policies of client countries.  Also, PRD research 
became increasingly interdisciplinary, drawing on the insights and methods of social sciences 
other than economics – particularly political science and sociology – in analyzing policy 
design and implementation. 
 
Around that time, PRD and the Africa region jointly developed a work program aimed at 
improving policy outcomes in Africa. The program identified six separate but related topics 
that are important for Africa but were under-studied.  A case study approach was planned to 
take place in ten countries.  Lyn Squire and Shanta Devarajan were the project coordinators.  
 
Research managers, in assessing relevance, consider the needs and priorities of both Bank 
operations and the development community. They may, for example, judge that insufficient 
evidence is available on a given topic—for instance, on the likely impact of WTO reforms, or 
of epidemics like the avian flu or the H1N1 flu—and decide to invest in those topics. 
Identifying those needs and the research necessary to meet them relies partly on the judgment 
of researchers and managers—all of whom are experts in their field—and partly on many 
other people. Operational staff suggests topics, so research often grows out of joint work 
between DEC and operations. Every researcher is expected to spend 30 percent of his or her 
time working with operations, and operational staff is often involved directly or indirectly 
with research projects. In addition, DEC managers frequently meet their counterparts in 
operations—for example, to discuss specific projects or in formal Network and Sector board 
meetings. Interactions with policymakers and researchers outside the Bank are also a constant 
source of stimulus. Finally, of course, the Senior Vice President and Chief Economist is 
heavily involved in guiding research priorities. 
 
One of the challenges of research management is to anticipate topics sufficiently early to 
have research ready to address them when it is required. Although it is difficult and risky, 
research management also needs to create initiative for researchers to explore “blue sky” 
issues before any demand for them has been expressed.  
 
A key tool for assessing the quality and relevance of research is through independent 
evaluations of Bank research.  During the 1990s and 2000s, there were constant efforts to 28 
 
enhance the relevance of Bank research by undertaking assessments and surveys of 
operational (internal) and policymaker (external) clients.
21
3.5.4  Resource Allocation & Funding 
 
Under the new matrix structure created in 1997, the Research Support Budget became the 
main vehicle to allow economists in the Regions and Networks to participate in research 
activities in addition to their operational work.  For instance, in March 2000, Joe Stiglitz—
Chief Economist, then Advisor to the President—in an email to the Managing Directors 
mentioned that “RSB funds are allocated through a comprehensive review process that 
considers both quality and relevance to the Bank’s operations and clients. The RSB is the 
only source of competitively-allocated funding for research. Experience in other institutions 
confirms that the quality of competitively-funded research is considerably higher than that of 
research produced under dedicated funds. The fact that these funds are not committed to 
particular units also provides flexibility, allowing Bank research to quickly address newly 
emerging problems.”   
 
  In 2005, the Chief Economist, 
François Bourguignon, commissioned such an evaluation, covering the period 1998-2005.  A 
panel headed by Angus Deaton and comprising some 25 world-renowned development 
economists was asked to assess the relevance and quality of Bank research.  The evaluation 
report, presented in 2006, was generally favorable, confirming that a strong in-house research 
capacity is necessary for the Bank, that much of the Bank’s research is of leading quality and 
that Bank researchers have delivered much more value added to the institution than the very 
small share of the budget that they command.  There were some detailed criticisms, however, 
in response to which a staff working party was constituted that weighed staff reactions to the 
evaluation and made recommendations to DECRG management.    
 
In 2000 and 2001, available resources for research had decreased—as had the willingness of 
managers in the Regions and Networks to support research.
22
Following the 30 percent rise in the RSB, with continuing disincentives to do research in the 
Regions and Networks, demand for RSB funds from these Bank departments stagnated.  Low 
  The production of research 
was concentrated in DEC.  There was an unmet demand for funds, reflected in nearly 100 
research prospectuses on critical issues submitted by Regions and Networks in response to a 
request by the Chief Economist. Presented with these regional and network research plans, 
the Managing Directors approved an increase of 30 percent in the RSB for FY02.  A 
“Regional and Network Research Initiative” was established to support DEC consultations 
with regions and networks to determine their research priorities and to provide funding for 
regional and network research on those topics.  
 
                                                 
21  In July 2000, Paul Collier approached the Research Committee for ex-post rating of research pertinence, as 
part of a broader strategy of building four quarterly indicators of DECRG performance.  In a first round, the 
Research Committee members were requested to evaluate 33 DECRG outputs published in the last quarter of 
1999.  He asked the Committee to assess each product based on its pertinence to the Bank’s operational mission, 
using the QAG scale (1 = highly satisfactory, 2 = fully satisfactory, 3 = marginally satisfactory, 4 = 
unsatisfactory).  In May 2001, another 76 reports were sent to the Committee.  However, since Research 
Committee members were already burdened with a heavy workload, the scoring was never completed and the 
process was stopped (see May 2001 RC Meeting minutes).    
 
22  As recorded in surveys, focus groups and informal discussions carried out by DECRS in 2003-04.
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demand for RSB funds coming from the Regions and Networks has persisted but coexisted 
with high demand for research funds from DEC itself.  A new type of grant—called Program 
grants—was created in FY01-02.
23
In the past decade, a major feature of the financing of Bank research has been the growth of 
Trust Funds.  The share of Trust Funds financing research increased from less than 10 
percent of the total in 1997 to around 30 percent in recent years.  About one-third comes from 
the Knowledge for Change Program (KCP), a large multi-donor trust fund providing much 
larger grants with a much less stringent review process than the RSB funds. 
   Large discretionary allocations were also granted for the 
World Development Report, the ABCDE meetings, the Development Impact Evaluation 
Initiative (DIME) and other initiatives of the Chief Economist. 
 
 
3.5.5  Focus of Research in the Past Decade 
 
In terms of substance, the emphasis of World Bank research has focused on two broad areas 
in recent years. First, considering country-level work, there has been a move away from 
macroeconomic studies and toward more emphasis on the country-specific microfoundations 
of growth and development. The aim is to better understand poorly functioning markets and 
market failures, how institutions arise at the micro-level to cope with such failures, and the 
implications for policy. Research programs on the investment climate and on mechanisms of 
delivering public services are core components of this work.
24
                                                 
23  Program grants—first requested by Paul Collier, Director of the DEC Research Group, in 2001—are intended 
to support a program of research in a particular development field and to allow the Research Committee to 
provide strategic directions on Bank research. The issues studied under such grants must relate to critical 
problems facing Bank client countries and operations. Each program should have a central integrative theme that 
gives cohesion to the research and its outputs.  Twelve Program Grants have been funded so far (on finance, 
poverty and investment climate) and all were given to DECRG.  An overall evaluation of the benefits of such 
Program Grants was requested by the Research Committee at its September 2004 and January 2006 meetings, but 
has never been carried out. 
 
24  For more details on the research program by sector in recent years, see World Bank 2009 and World 
Bank 2007. 
 
 There has also been a growing 
interest in the role of institutions in shaping governance. Research continues on aid 
effectiveness and on policies to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This 
work focuses on the consistency between public expenditure programs and development 
goals, on scaling up assistance to meet the MDGs, and on the political economy of 
development assistance.  
 
Second, the Bank has long been undertaking research on global issues, including trade policy 
reform, the impact of World Trade Organization (WTO) and regional trade arrangements, 
agricultural trade, and the abolition of the textile quotas and the Doha Round. In addition, a 
major research program on the role of international migration and remittances in 
development started in 2004. Research on important global externalities, such as climate 
change and conflicts, has also been initiated. The latter focuses on fragile low-income states 
and also examines new approaches to aid in post-conflict countries. 
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Over the past decade the Bank research program has increasingly been involved in two broad 





Evaluative research aims at rigorously assessing whether development policies are effective, 
and the circumstances under which their effectiveness could be improved.  This type of 
research is broader than impact evaluation and embraces both “micro” interventions in 
specific sectors and macro policies.  It includes both ex ante and ex post evaluation. The 
Bank’s potential for evaluative research is a unique feature of the institution within the 
development community.  Operational staff in the Bank continually search for operational 
solutions to pressing development problems. Bank researchers have the training and skills 
needed to provide the conceptual and technical tools to support that search, and to help learn 
from the institution’s successes and failures.   
 
Evaluative research starts with a clear understanding of the problem that a policy or project is 
addressing.  Researchers can often help in identifying the policy objectives (properly 
weighing gains across different sub-groups of a population, and different generations) and the 
relevant constraints, which include resource, information, incentives and political economy 
constraints.  This role for research can be important when development policy making is 
captured by lobby groups, advocating narrow sectoral interests.  The existence of trade-offs 
between sectors (such as due to governmental budget constraints), spillover effects across 
sectors (costs and benefits to one sector from policies in another) and interaction effects 
(whereby attainments in one dimension influence the impacts of policies in another) beg for a  
broader perspective on the normative foundations of policy.   
 
As is now widely appreciated, evaluative research must always assess impacts against 
explicit and relevant counterfactuals, such as the absence of the policy in question or some 
policy option.  This requires sound evaluation designs, using good data and credible 
strategies for identifying causal impacts from those data (see Ravallion 2005; Deaton 2009). 
A  major program of impact evaluation responding to the increasing demand to improve 
development effectiveness and assess results on the ground was launched in 2005: it is called 
the Development Impact Evaluation (DIME) initiative, a concerted effort throughout the 
Bank which supports and coordinates evaluations of Bank-financed programs for different 
types of development interventions. This program also monitors the performance of projects 
and identifies what works and when. 
 
Evaluative research has been driven by important development questions (unlike what too 
often happens, in this case it is the question that is driving the research agenda and not a 
preference for certain data or certain methods).  For example, DECRG researchers trying to 
understand persistent poverty and the impacts of antipoverty programs have been drawn into 
the theories and methods favored in sociology and psychology.   
 
 
Evaluative research has also recognized the importance of context, which is key to scaling up 
lessons from research.  Since the impact of development interventions is expected to vary 
across beneficiaries, any research would have weak external validity if the contextual 
                                                 
25 See Ravallion 2007. 
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factors—including the circumstances of participants, the cultural and political environment, 
and the administrative context—were not taken into account.   For example, a recent 
evaluation by DECRG of a large World Bank lending operation found low overall impact but 
also found considerable heterogeneity, with some types of households benefiting more than 
others. The policy implication is that choosing different beneficiaries would have greatly 
increased the project’s overall impact. Furthermore, not all sources of heterogeneity are 
observable, and participants and stakeholders often react to factors unobserved by the 
researcher, confounding efforts to identify true impacts using standard methods. 
 
Evaluative research must be feasible in the contexts in which the policies and programs are 
introduced.  Since we are typically dealing with the policies of governments, the ethics and 
political economy of feasibility inevitably constrain research options.  For example, in 
evaluating public safety net programs it is sometimes impossible to set up a baseline survey, 
since one cannot reasonably delay the program for such a purpose; data collection methods 
must adapt accordingly, and this can be costly.  There is also a potential, but under-explored, 
role for “evaluative monitoring” of development projects, whereby the tools of project 
monitoring are modified or extended to allow more rapid feedback to operational staff on the 




The second type of cross-cutting research that has increasingly occupied Bank research in the 
past decade can be termed methodological research.  Practitioners carry a set of tools to 
policies and projects, including data, measures and models.   Researchers have played a 
useful role assessing those tools and helping improve them.  They have assessed whether data 
are sound.  They have also assessed whether the measures have a clear theoretical foundation 
and are the most relevant ones for specific policy problems (i.e., whether the measures used 
are adapted to the objectives and constraints relevant to each policy problem—which is not as 
common as one might think).  Finally they have also examined whether the assumptions 
made in modeling are both realistic and internally consistent.   
 
Methodological research can help expand the tool kit routinely employed by policymakers 
and analysts.  This includes the data collected and the methods used to analyze those data, 
including software. The Bank has become a major producer of development data, and 
researchers have played a crucial role.  A number of the Bank’s most successful data 
initiatives started as research projects.  The best example is probably the Living Standards 
Measurement Study, which started as a research project in the mid-1980s with the aim of 
greatly improving household survey data in developing countries. The LSMS database 
houses over 75 survey datasets with all the relevant documentation. The more recent research 
projects are designed to improve data collection methods and develop suitable welfare 
measures to assess poverty.   
 
Researchers have also added a lot of value to the Bank’s operational work by developing 
useful analytic tools in real applications, often working with colleagues in Operations.  For 
example, DECRG has developed software programs that have facilitated data analysis in 
client countries, such as the widely used Povcal.  Recently-developed  software to estimate 
poverty maps combines household survey data and population census data, a procedure so 
computationally intensive that standard statistical software packages such as STATA, SAS or 
SPSS often become unwieldy and sometimes even nonfunctional.   32 
 
4  Concluding Remarks 
 
The World Bank remains the leading intellectual institution in development and has been a 
world leader in a number of important areas, including poverty measurement, delivery of 
social services, impact evaluation, measurement of development outcomes, international 
trade and migration.  It has also been a leader in generating survey data on important 
dimensions of development including Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS); 
enterprise surveys (also known as Investment Climate surveys), and Purchasing Power Parity 
measurement through the International Price Comparison Project. 
 
Bank research is resolutely oriented toward policy.  Researchers play a crucial role in both 
learning from past policies and thinking critically about future policies.  Without research, 
the conceptual foundations for policy making would be weak; there would be very little new 
knowledge or data to inform policy decisions; there would be little or no innovation; and we 
would know too little about what succeeds and what fails in the fight for development and 
against poverty.  Without research and critical inspection to measure failure and success, 
deeply flawed policy orthodoxies would persist and successful policies would be dropped for 
the wrong reasons.    
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